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I. Introduction 
Corporate executives are paid at extremely high levels compared to lower-level 
employees, especially in the United States, and their level of compensation usually does 
not change based on company performance with respect to competitors, but rather with 
changes in their company's stock price. It is well known that executive compensation 
among U.S. corporations is comprised mostly of stock options, sometimes up to 90% of 
overall compensation (Edgar 2002). These stock options allow executives, namely chief 
executive officers (CEOs), to cash in big bucks during good times and risk zero losses 
during bad times. 
In addition, a problem exists among publicly traded corporations, known as the 
principal-agent problem (Garen 1994). Executives, especially CEOs, control the 
company, and must use their own discretion in handling the capital supplied by owners, 
or shareholders. Recently, executives of some U.S. corporations have abused money 
supplied by shareholders for their own benefit, and have overseen the manipulation of 
financial statements to create false investor optimism and boost their company's stock 
price for their own short term gain (Gimein 2002). 
In a Fortune magazine article entitled "You Bought, They Sold.", Mark Gimein 
(2002) explains that many corporate CEOs took advantage of a stock bubble to cash in 
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of risk-free stock options at vastly inflated prices. 
For instance, San Diego Padres chairman, John Mooress, sold $646 million in Padres 
stock before announcing that the baseball team's revenues had been misstated. Also, 
Qwest Communication executives sold $2.26 billion of company stock--$1.6 billion was 
sold by former CEO Phil Anschutz-shortly before the corporation announced it had 
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inflated its revenues over the past 3 years (Gimein 2002). According to Gimein (2002), 
since the announcement Qwest's stock price has dropped from $47.25/share to just over 
$1/share at the time the article was published. 
More evidence of executive malfeasance is seen in a study conducted by Fortune 
magazine, Thomson Financial, and the University of Chicago's Center for Research in 
Securities Pricing. The study analyzes 1,035 corporations having a market cap of at least 
$400 million and experiencing at least a 75% decline in stock price from January 1999 to 
May 2002. Gimien (2002) reports that according to the study executives and directors 
sold roughly $66 billion of their own company's stock. A reported $23 billion went to 
466 insiders at the 25 corporations where executives cashed out the most stock (Gimien 
2002). Table 1 presents the "Top Ten" companies from the study with respect to the 
amount of money executives realized by selling their own shares of company stock. 
These examples illustrate that there have been numerous instances where the 
actions ofthe agents (CEOs) have clearly been at odds with the interests ofthe principals 
(shareholders). This raises the question of whether the current structure of compensation, 
with emphasis on stock options, contributes to the principal-agent problem. 
The purpose of this paper is two fold. First, I will test a set of hypotheses 
concerning how certain components of CEO compensation effects the percent changes in 
reported earnings and shareholder wealth from 1993-2001. Second, I will test the 
hypothesis that a major sell off of stock conducted by CEOs will trigger a significant 
decline in reported earnings or shareholder wealth. 
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Table 1: Top Ten List 
Company $ Realized by Executives $ Realized by CEO 
Qwest Communications $2.26 billion $1.57 billion 
Broadcom $2.08 billion $799 million 
AOL TimeWarner $1.79 billion $475 million 
Gateway $1.27 billion $1.10 billion 
ARIBA $1.24 billion $191 million 
JDS Uniphase $1.15 billion $175 million 
12 Technologies $1.03 billion $447 million 
Sun Microsystems $1.03 billion $103 million 
Enron $994 million $102 million 
Global Crossing $951 million $505 million 
The rest of the paper will follow as such. Section II will review the literature on 
principal-agent theory and four basic components of executive compensation. Section III 
discusses the data set used to conduct the study. Section IV explains the empirical 
model. Section V presents the regression results. Section VI presents an alternative 
hypothesis and model. Finally, section VII discusses policy implications. 
II. Theory and Literature Review 
A. Principal-Agent Theory 
Principal-agent theory refers to the separation of ownership and control among 
publicly traded corporations and has been widely used to analyze executive 
compensation. In reference to executive compensation, principal-agent theory states that 
the principals, or shareholders, of a corporation must effectively motivate the agent, or 
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CEO, to act in their best interests. Although the principals own the corporation, it is the 
CEO that has control over essentially all material business decisions. So how can 
shareholders make sure that the boss of their company is looking out for their interests? 
Can't shareholders simply observe the actions of the CEO and compensate, or discharge, 
the CEO accordingly? Unfortunately, things are not so simple. 
One major problem, according to Jensen and Murphy (1990), is that shareholders 
do not have complete information regarding the CEO's activities and the company's 
investment opportunities. Ideally, shareholders could come together and form a contract 
that specifies their CEO's actions in every possible situation. Realistically, though, 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) state that shareholders almost always do not know what 
actions the CEO can take or which actions will increase shareholder wealth. And, while 
shareholder wealth is certainly affected by factors outside the CEO's influence, such as 
market conditions and public policy, it is in the best interests of the shareholders to 
compensate their CEO on the basis of shareholder wealth (Jensen and Murphy 1990). 
Therefore, Jensen and Murphy (1990) analyze this relationship between CEO 
compensation and shareholder wealth across publicly traded corporations. They create a 
pay-performance sensitivity variable that is defined as the dollar change in the CEO's 
wealth associated with a dollar change in the wealth of the shareholders. From the results 
of their study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that while the CEO pay-performance 
relationship is positive and significant, the value of the relationship is too low. In other 
words, CEO's are not bearing enough risk and are not being effectively motivated 
through incentives. They found that through cash compensation, stock options, 
stockholdings, and threat of dismissal, CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 
4 
change in shareholder wealth. Also, they show that CEO direct ownership levels-which 
do not include stock options--have declined over the past 50 years, and hypothesize that 
public and private political forces impose constraints that reduce the pay-performance 
sensitivity (Jensen and Murphy 1990). There is no doubt that this reduction in direct 
ownership levels has been an important factor in the reduction ofthe pay-performance 
variable. Reductions in the pay-performance relation and the level of CEO pay since the 
1930s support their hypothesis. 
In another attempt to solve the principal-agent problem as it applies to executive 
compensation, John Garen (1994) forms an equation that describes the composition of 
CEO pay: Yi = bO + bIRi, where Yi is the CEO's compensation of corporation i and Ri is 
a measure of corporation i's income. The coefficient bO represents salary and bonus, and 
hI indicates the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance, much like Jensen and 
Murphy's pay-performance sensitivity variable. One purpose ofGaren's study is to 
determine why previous studies have shown that bI varies greatly across corporations. 
Most of his findings are consistent with the principal-agent theory, in that 
compensation is structured to trade off incentives with insurance. As the CEO is required 
to engage in riskier activities, the insurance portion of pay is increased and the incentive 
portion is reduced. For example, those companies that spend more money in R&D-­
uncertain and sometimes risky investments-- have compensation packages that provide 
more insurance for the CEO and are not as sensitive to firm performance. Overall, Garen 
(1994) finds that the statistical significance ofhis findings is low, but the magnitude of 
the effects is substantial. In addition, the explanatory power of the empirical model for 
pay-performance is quite low, similar to Jensen and Murphy's (1990) study. 
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Furthermore, he finds little evidence of the significance of relative performance pay as 
one might expect in a principal-agent setting. In sum, Oaren (1994) shows that principal­
agent considerations do have an important effect on executive compensation, but many 
issues in the determination of CEO pay are unresolved. 
B. Building on Garen's Equation and Principal-Agent Theory 
According to Oaren (1994), executive compensation from the perspective of 
principal-agent theory can be broken down into the following formula: Yi = bO + bI Ri 
where Y is total compensation for the CEO of company i, bO is a fixed component of 
compensation, R is the reported income for company i, and bI is the component of CEO 
compensation that is sensitive to company i's reported income (Ri). In trying to find an 
appropriate value for bI, or pay-performance sensitivity, it is first essential to breakdown 
the variable that it is attached to-something that Oaren, and Jensen and Murphy, failed 
to do. If bi represents the component of compensation that is tied to reported income, (as 
it is in Oaren's study--it is tied to shareholder wealth in Jensen and Murphy's study) it is 
necessary to determine what makes up this reported income component, Ri. Obviously, if 
the agent's pay is in anyway sensitive to the performance of the company, then once the 
components of performance (Ri) are established, we know exactly how the CEO is 
motivated. It is my contention that some forms of compensation motivate the CEO to act 
in his own best interests, which are not necessarily the same interests ofthe shareholders. 
According to the following two equations, the reported income of company i, Ri 
can be broken down as follows: 
Ri = Actual income + (Reported income - Actual income) or, 
Ri = Real performance + Accounting Fraud 
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Actual income of a company is also known as its real performance, and the difference 
between the income reported by company i and its actual income (real performance) can 
be viewed as accounting fraud. 
Intuitively, CEOs who have compensation packages that are tied directly to 
reported earnings of their company, Ri, will have incentive to increase Ri either through 
real performance (actual income) or through accounting fraud. My model is based on the 
belief that accounting fraud overseen by corporate CEOs is induced by certain 
components of executive compensation, as represented by the following equation: 
Accounting fraud = f (component(s) of compensation) 
Therefore it would be ideal to form a model that will a.) capture this accounting 
fraud variable, and b.) explain which components of compensation cause CEOs to engage 
in accounting fraud. While it is impossible to quantify the accounting fraud component 
of Ri, it may be possible to distinguish those companies whose CEOs have cheated if we 
can assume that cheating occurs in companies whose reported income (Ri) experience a 
steep incline in early years, followed by a sharp decline in later years. In other words, we 
must assume that firms who "cook the books" will experience false short term prosperity, 
but, without a strong foundation of real performance, the "bottom will fall out"--the 
accounting fraud will surface, and income will tumble, as well as the stock price. 
Take the case of Qwest Communications. Its executives sold $2.26 billion of 
company stock--$1.6 billion sold by former CEO Phil Anschutz alone-shortly before 
the corporation announced it had inflated its revenues over the past 3 years (Gimein 
2002). According to Gimein (2002), since the announcement, Qwest's stock price has 
dropped from $47.25/share to just over $lIshare at the time the Business Week article was 
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financial statements in order to inflate earnings. Once the accounting fraud was 
discovered a fearful stock market responded and billions of dollars were lost by 
shareholders (Powers 2000). 
There are other ways that fraudulent accounting leads to a decline in real long-run 
performance, other than by damaging investor confidence. For instance, fraudulent 
accounting could lead to excess capacity of resources in one industry. If the majority of 
the companies in an industry significantly, and falsely, inflate their reported earnings, 
those companies may attract more capital than they would have if they reported their real 
earnings. The resulting excess capacity of resources will eventually lead to inefficiencies 
in that industry. The industry may also attract more debt than it can really finance, as 
well as extra equity from investors, which leads to bankruptcy for the firms and negative 
returns for investors. According to bankruptcydata.com, such corporate bankruptcies 
have increased significantly over the last three years. 
On the firm level, inflated earnings via accounting fraud may lead to an increase 
in production costs. For instance, labor may push for an increase in wages ifit believes 
that their firm is experiencing solid profits. Also, lower level managers may increase 
production if they also believe that the company is in good condition (this would be less 
likely since most production decisions come from upper management, and since internal 
decisions are based on managerial accounting rather than financial accounting). These 
extra costs apply unwanted pressure on what would be already meager earnings. In 
theory, costs will exceed earnings to the extent that either a.) executives will no longer be 
able to hide their real financial standing and must release it to the public, or b.) the firm 
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goes bankrupt-both scenarios causing an obvious slide in investor confidence, and stock 
price. 
Figure 1 below shows the pattern that is expected in finns that have committed 
accounting fraud in early periods by overstating their earnings. Those finns will see a 
consistent and sharp increase in reported earnings early on, followed by a rapid decline. 
As previously stated, one purpose of my paper will be to detennine the effects of certain 
fonns of CEO compensation on the percent change in reported earnings and shareholder 
wealth, as well as detennine the effects of exercisable stock options on the pattern of the 
percent change in reported earnings and shareholder wealth over time. With the growing 
popularity of stock options as a fonn of CEO compensation over the decade of the 1990s 
and into the 2000s many CEOs' pay are strongly linked to the stock price of their finns. 
Stock options and the other main components of executive compensation are discussed 
below. 
C. Components of Executive Compensation 
Because it is nearly impossible for shareholders to monitor CEOs directly, it is the 
responsibility of the shareholders' appointed board of directors to fulfill that role. One 
way that boards attempt to align their CEOs' interests with the shareholders' is in 
structuring the CEO's compensation package. This paper will focus on four basic 
components that made up approximately 87% of CEO pay for all companies in the S&P 
500 in 1996 (Abowd and Kaplan 1999). They include salary, bonus, short tenn stock 
options (exercisable), and long tenn stock options (unexercisable). 
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Figure 1: Expected Pattern of the Annual Percent Change in Reported 
Earnings and Shareholder Wealth for Firms who Committed Significant 
Accounting Fraud 
Rit, Sit 
o 
o o 
o 
o o o 
o 
Time 
o 
1. Salary 
According to Abowd and Kaplan (1999), salary and bonuses comprised over 38% 
of CEO compensation of S&P 500 companies in 1996. Past studies combine salary and 
bonus when estimating the effects of compensation on shareholders. However, I believe 
it is necessary to separate salary and bonus, mainly because salary is fixed over time, and 
bonus varies usually with some level of company performance. Salary can be seen as a 
fixed amount of cash compensation that is determined at the beginning of an annual pay 
cycle (Abowd and Kaplan 1999). 
The amount of salary a CEO receives is based on his or her time, in almost all 
cases, a year, and not his or her performance, at least not in the short run (Borjas 1999). 
However, in the long run, the firm can base decisions of retention or dismissal on 
performance (Borjas 1999). In terms of level of salary, firms should be willing to pay a 
high price to attract the best talent. However, from viewing data taken from annual proxy 
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statements, the value of salary compared to other components, especially stock options, is 
rather miniscule for almost all firms (Edgar 2002). Also, the annual increase in CEO 
salaries among the firms studied also seems insignificant compared to bonus and options 
(Edgar 2002). Finally, since the salary component is essentially independent of current 
effort, the CEO does not receive much incentive to perform. 
Relating salary to Ri, which is actual income + accounting fraud, I do not believe 
that we will see a significant relationship. Although higher salary CEOs should be the 
most talented, and productive, in practice salaries are a very small component of 
compensation and do not impact the decisions made by the CEO relative to bonuses and 
stock options. Therefore, I hypothesize that the salary component will have no 
significant effect on the percent change ofreported income, or shareholder wealth over 
time. 
2. Bonus 
Unlike salary, bonus is a component of compensation that is based on 
performance. According to Borjas (1999), bonuses "are payments awarded to workers 
above and beyond the base salary, and are typically linked to the worker's (or to the 
firm's) performance during a specified period of time". It is not uncommon for bonus to 
significantly exceed the base salary for a corporate CEO (Edgar 2002). Most bonus 
programs reward the CEO and other top executives when certain financial ratios, such as 
return on assets (ROA), which is equal to net income divided by total assets, exceed a 
certain level (Edgar 2002). 
However, Abowd and Kaplan (1999) remind us that economic theory does not 
predict that increases in incentives, by way of bonus, necessarily lead to increases in 
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profitability. For instance, if a CEO is currently receiving bonuses that are close to the 
firm's profit-maximizing level, then a slight increase in bonuses, or incentives, should 
lead to practically no change in profitability. However, economic theory also tells us that 
CEOs will work harder when given larger incentives to do so. The following has been 
found by previous studies. 
Abowd and Kaplan (1999) explain that research shows mixed results in terms of 
the effect of bonuses on a firm's profitability. However, Kahn and Sherer (1990) found 
that managers whose bonus payments are contingent upon subjective evaluations tended 
to have higher subsequent evaluations, compared to other managers. Still, incentive 
plans may result in unintended effects as shown by Holthoausen, Larcker and Sloan 
(1995). They discovered that when management is operating above the maximum of 
their bonus plan, that they tend to manipulate earnings downward. Little evidence of 
such manipulation was found when managers are below the minimum performance level 
that allows a bonus. 
Overall, I hypothesize that firms who grant high bonuses to their CEOs will 
experience significantly higher percent changes in both reported earnings and stock 
price than those firms who grant their CEOs low bonuses. 
3.) Stock Options 
The growing popularity of stock options in executive compensation over the last 
10 years has attracted much literature and controversy. Stock options comprised 49% of 
CEO compensation for S&P 500 companies in 1996 (Abowd and Kaplan 1999). Many 
studies have been performed to determine the effects of stock option compensation on 
company performance and shareholder wealth, resulting in mixed views. Yet, because 
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shareholder expectations are embedded in the returns that stock options provide, it is very 
difficult to gain guidance on this subject from economic theory (Abowd and Kaplan 
1999). In addition, as seen through bonuses, economic theory does not predict that 
increases in incentives, even stock options, necessarily lead to an increase in reported 
earnings (Abowd and Kaplan 1999). Before jumping to what past studies have found, the 
following is meant to provide a basic understanding of the fundamentals of stock options. 
a.) Stock Options--Explained 
Stock option grants allow CEOs to purchase a specified number of shares of stock 
at some point in the future at a fixed exercise price, known as the strike price (Abowd and 
Kaplan 1999). Therefore, recipients of stock options will want the stock price to rise 
above the strike price, which is established at the grant date, by the time the option is 
exercisable (available to purchase). Usually, options have maturity dates of 5-10 years, 
meaning that the CEO's right to exercise, or purchase, their options expires anywhere 
from 5-10 years (Abowd and Kaplan 1999). Also, most companies do not allow its 
CEOs to exercise their options within the first few years of the grant date. Thus, stock 
options granted today can be thought of as a long term form of compensation. If the CEO 
can increase profitability, which in theory increases the stock price, over the long run, 
then the CEO will be rewarded once the options become exercisable. However, most 
veteran executives already have exercisable options in their compensation packages, 
which provide short-term incentives to boost the firm's stock price. In sum, almost all 
executives hold a mix of unexercisable and exercisable stock options (Edgar 2002). 
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But, do stock options really work? That is, do stock options as a form of 
compensation help solve the principal-agent problem and align the interests of CEOs with 
shareholders? As we have seen, according to Jensen and Murphy (1990), options, along 
with other compensation, provide a weak alignment between shareholder and managerial 
interests. However, Haubrich (1994) believes that even low levels of alignment impose 
significant wealth risk on CEOs making it unclear whether performance would improve 
by increasing alignment. Also, by using both new stock option awards and the change in 
market value of options and stock already awarded, Hall and Liebman (1998) found that 
CEO wealth is significantly more sensitive to shareholder wealth than found by Jensen 
and Murphy (1990). Using data from 1994, they found that the median's CEO wealth 
changes at a rate of$5.39 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. The changes in 
the value of held stock-options, which were not used in Jensen and Murphy's study, 
account for the $2.14 difference. Jensen & Murphy found that CEO wealth changes only 
$3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. 
Past research has shown that there is a definite empirical link between shareholder 
and CEO wealth by way of stock options. In addition, Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000) 
find that stock options as a form of compensation are theoretically justified. In their 
study, Bryan et al. (2000) find that the use of stock options is shown to increase for 
companies with abundant investment opportunities (to protect against risk) and high 
volatility of earnings relative to stock returns. In other words stock options can be used 
to guard CEOs from bearing too much risk compared to direct stock ownership. When 
risk is present, stock options give the CEO the option for their compensation to be tied 
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directly to the stock price, whereas direct stock ownership forces such a direct 
relationship. Also, Bryan et al. (2000) find that the use of stock option awards also 
increases for firms with low liquidity and decreases for firms with high marginal tax rates 
(tax treatment on stock options is not attractive to corporations) (Bryan et al. 2002). So, 
besides attempting to link the interests of the principal and agent, stock options serve a 
practical purpose by allowing corporations to protect their executives against risk and 
avoid otherwise significant firm-wide financial difficulties, such as lack of cash for 
compensation purposes. 
However, although certain characteristics of stock options make them attractive to 
both the corporation and recipient (CEO), they cause an even bigger incentive for CEO's 
to boost their company's stock price. It has already been shown by Albrecht (2003) that 
most financial statement (accounting) fraud occurs "because management is under 
pressure to report positive or high income to support stock prices." Ifmanagement's 
compensation is tied directly to stock options, then the incentive to increase the stock 
price intensifies the motivation of management to commit accounting fraud. Therefore I 
believe that those CEOs who are compensated heavily through stock options will have a 
very high incentive to increase reported income and shareholder wealth through actual 
performance and/or accounting fraud. Here are my hypotheses for relating to stock 
options: 
1.) Firms whose CEO's possess a high value ofunexercisable (long-term) stock 
options will experience a significantly higher percent change in reported 
income (Rit) and shareholder wealth (Sit) than firms whose CEO possesses 
low values ofunexercisable options. 
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2.) Firms whose CEO's possess a high value ofexercisable (short-term) stock 
options will experience an increase in annual reported income and 
shareholder wealth followed by a sharp decline in both (as shown in Figure 
1). 
III. Data 
I will test my hypotheses using data from the Edgar (2002) web site which serves 
as a database of the Securities and Exchange Commission filings for all publicly traded 
companies. From annual proxy statements, I have collected executive compensation data 
for twenty of the thirty companies that comprise the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, 
chosen at random. Corporations who file with the SEC are required to report detailed 
information concerning their executive compensation packages starting in 1993. Thus, I 
will use annual data from 1993-2001 for each company. The final sample size is 180 (20 
companies, 9 years). Table 2 identifies which companies will be tested, as well as the 
type of compensation those companies pay to their CEO. 
The sample of 20 companies are split up into ten "high" and ten "low" companies 
in reference to the average annual dollar value of certain forms of compensation over the 
years of 1993-1996. The ten high dollar value companies for each form of compensation 
are presented below. 
IV. Empirical Model 
The previous section established 4 hypotheses concerning the effects of various 
components of CEO compensation on Rit and Sit. These hypotheses are: 
1.) The salary component will have no significant effect a firm's reported 
earnings or shareholder wealth. 
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2.) Firms who grant higher bonuses to their CEOs will experience significantly 
higher percent changes in both reported earnings and stock price than firms who 
grant lower bonuses. I do not believe that high bonuses provide enough incentive 
to commit accounting fraud. 
Table 2: Data List 
High Salary High Bonus High ST Opt. High LT Opt. 
Citigroup American Express American Express American Express 
General Electric Citigroup DuPont Citigroup 
General Motors DuPont General Electric General Electric 
IBM General Electric IBM IBM 
Kodak General Motors Intel Intel 
McDonald's Home Depot Johnson & Johnson Johnson & Johnson 
Merck IBM McDonald's Kodak 
Philip Morris Intel Philip Morris McDonald's 
Procter & Gamble Kodak Procter & Gamble Merck 
United Technolgies Merck United Technologies United Technologies 
3.) Firms whose CEO's possess a high value of unexercisable (long-term) stock 
options will experience a significantly higher percent change in reported income 
(Rit) and shareholder wealth (Sit) than firms whose CEO possesses low values of 
unexercisable options 
4.) Firms whose CEO's possess a high value of exercisable (short-term) stock 
options will experience an increase in annual reported income and shareholder 
wealth followed by a sharp decline in both (as shown in Figure 1). 
17 
All ofthe variables used to test these hypotheses are defined in Table 3 below: 
Variable Name 
Reported Earnings 
(Rit) 
Shareholder Value 
(Sit) 
High Salary 
High Bonus 
High LT Opt 
High ST Opt 
Time 
Time'2 
Table 3: Variable Definitions 
Type 
Dependent 
Dependent 
Independent 
Independent 
Independent 
Independent 
Independent 
Independent 
•
 
Definition 
Annual percent change in net income for 
company i in year t 
Annual percent change in stock price minus 
annual percent change in the S&P 500 for 
company i in year t 
Dummy variable, receives a value of one 
if the CEO receives a high salary 
Dummy variable, receives a value of one 
if the CEO receives a high bonus 
Dummy variable, receives a value of one 
if the CEO receives a high value of 
unexercisable stock options 
Dummy variable, receives a value of one 
if the CEO receives a high value of 
exercisable stock options 
Receives a value of 1 for '93, 
2 for '94, etc. up to 2001­
used to estimate linear time 
pattern. 
Receives a value of 1 for '93, 
4 for '94, etc. up to 2001­
used to estimate a non-linear 
time pattern. 
The first three hypotheses are tested by running the following 3 sets of simple 
regressions: 
Hypothesis #1:
 
Rit = al + a2(High Salary)
 
Sit = al + a2(High Salary)
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Hypothesis #2: 
Rit = a1 + a2(High Bonus)
 
Sit = a1 + a2(High Bonus)
 
Hypothesis #3: 
Rit = a1 + a2(High LT Opt)
 
Sit = a1 + a2(High LT Opt)
 
The above six regression equations simply estimate the effects of CEOs who 
receive high values of compensation components on percent changes in reported earnings 
and shareholder wealth compared to those who receive low values of compensation. 
I will test my final hypothesis, Hypothesis #4, by running the following 
regressions for the sample often firms that have a high level of short term stock options: 
Rit= a1 + a2 TIME + a3 TIMEI\2 + a41ntel + a5GE + a6McDonalds + a7Dupont +
 
a8Philip + a9Johnson + a10UT + a11PG + a12IBM
 
Sit= a1 + a2 TIME + a3 TIMEI\2 + a41ntel + a5GE + a6McDonalds + a7Dupont +
 
a8Philip + a9Johnson + a10UT + a11PG + a12IBM 
If a2 is positive and significant, and a3 is negative and significant then we may accept the 
hypothesis that CEOs who receive a high value of exercisable (short term) stock options 
will be more prone than CEOs who receive a low value of exercisable stock options to 
commit accounting fraud. The firms included in the model are used to control for firm 
specific effects. 
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V.	 Results 
Tables 4,5 and 6 present my results for all four hypotheses: 
Table 4: Results for Reported Earnings (Rit) for Tests 1-3 
(N =180) (t statistics are in parentheses) 
Variable Constant Coefficient Adj. RI\2 
High Salary 1.184 2.043 (.639) -.003 
High Bonus 1.092 2.226 (.696) .487 
High LT Opt 1.202 2.006 (.627) -.003 
Table 5: Results for Shareholder Wealth (Sit) for Tests 1-3 
(N =180) (t statistics are in parentheses) 
Variable Constant Coefficient 
High Salary .0787 -.0790 (-.177) -.005 
High Bonus .0578 .0340 (.761) -.002 
High LT Opt .0497 .0502 (.1.125) .001 
Unfortunately, none of the coefficients were significant. Therefore, I found that 
none of the components of CEO compensation for the firms tested significantly effect 
percent change in reported earnings or shareholder wealth, or the timing pattern of those 
measures. 
VI.	 "Year After" Analysis 
There could be several explanations as to why the results were insignificant and in 
most cases did not support the hypothesis. First, due to data and time restrictions, only 
10 companies were selected per regression for a sample size of 90. More successful 
studies on the topic of executive compensation test 500-1500 companies. The problem, 
and perhaps the reason for my poor results, is that with such a small sample size it only 
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takes one outlier to distort the results, whereas many outliers are needed to affect the 
results of a large sample. 
Table 6: Results for Reported Earnings (Rit) and Shareholder Wealth (Sit) for Test 
#4 (t statistics are in parentheses) 
Indpendent Variable Rit Regression Sit Regression 
Constant .851 (2.167) .143 (.984) 
Time -.195 (-1.373) -.0220 (-.419) 
Timel\2 .0122 (.879) .00224 (.438) 
Procter .315 (.870) -.0291 (-.218) 
IBM -.0282 (-.078) .0770 (.575) 
UT -.394 (-1.089) -.00296 (-.022) 
Johnson -.0381 (-.105) -.0340 (-.253) 
Philip -.167 (-.462) -.0443 (.351) 
Dupont .491 (1.358) -.143 (-1.065) 
McDonald -.194 (-.537) -.126 (-.943) 
GeneralE -.131 (-.363) .00987 (.074) 
Intel -.0249 (-.069) .138 (1.030) 
N 180 180 
Adj. RI\2 .044 -.044 
Secondly, I've concluded that even if compensation significantly affects reported 
earnings and shareholder return it is nearly impossible to capture one, definite pattern of 
these measures among multiple firms due to the timing of their compensation awards, as 
the test for hypothesis #4 attempted to do. Companies will grant options and bonuses 
during different years over a 9 year span. Some companies will experience peaks and 
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declines in Rit and Sit during different years. Therefore, with 10 firms, there may be at 
least one company peaking in each year of the study, which would distort results. This 
may be due to the fact that some companies award different levels of stock options in 
different years. I distinguished high option firms from low option firms by looking at the 
average of the value of options over the first 4 years of the observed time period. This 
was necessary to hypothesize long-term effects. However, some companies may be low 
options firms in the early '90s, but high option firms later in the decade due to timing 
differences of option grants. Consequently, if compensation structure does effect 
shareholder value and reported earnings, these timing differences make it nearly 
impossible to capture a similar time pattern across several firms. 
Since timing is such an important factor in determining how CEO compensation 
affects reported earnings and shareholder wealth, it may be necessary to look at each firm 
on a case-by-case basis. More specifically, it would be interesting to see how companies 
perform in the year after their CEO exercises the largest dollar amount of options over 
the 9 year period from 1993-2001. In other words, the next step is to observe whether or 
not companies experience a decline in reported earnings and shareholder wealth, and the 
magnitude of such decline, in the year following their CEO's big sell off. If it is found 
that companies perform poorly immediately following a large CEO exercise of options, 
then it can be argued that fraud has occurred. 
The following simple regression equations can be used to estimate those effects: 
Rit = al + a2(Exercise dummy) 
Sit = al + a2(Exercise dummy) 
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Simply put, these regressions are estimating the values of the percent change in reported 
earnings and shareholder returns the year after that company's CEO received more cash 
from selling stock options than in any other year observed. The dollar value of options 
exercised by the CEO will be used to determine the dummy. The dummy variable will 
have a value of one in the year after the company's CEO conducted the sell off. It will 
have the value of zero for the remaining eight years. 
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of each regression:
 
Table 7: Results for Reported Earnings
 
Adj. R A 2 =.023
 
N=180 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Sig. 
Constant 2.375 1.676 .158
 
Exercise Dummy -1.907 5.623 .735
 
Table 8: Results for Shareholder Value 
Adj. R A 2 =.023 
N=180 
Variable Name 
Constant 
Coefficient 
.143 
Std. Error 
.023 
Sig. 
.000 
Exercise Dummy -.171 .075 .024 
The results for shareholder wealth are very significant and can tell us a lot about 
the consequences of large CEO sell offs. According to the results, shareholder wealth 
experiences a 17% decline in the year after the CEO sells an unusually large value of 
stock options. And these results are significant at the 95% confidence level. 
This stresses the importance of studying the timing of option awards, and sales, of 
individual companies and CEOs rather than trying to find a common pattern over a fixed 
time period. Here, we looked at a particular year for each firm where the CEO sold the 
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most stock options instead of assuming that all CEOs conducted huge sell offs around the 
same time. The following describes a few individual cases of CEOs dumping their shares 
and the effects of shareholder wealth subsequent thereto. 
In 1997 the CEO of Citigroup Inc. sold 14.7 million shares of options and 
received over $220 million in cash. The following year, Citigroup stock suffered a 35% 
decline compared to the S&P 500. In 1998 Philip Morris' CEO dumped 573,000 shares 
to receive nearly $19 million. One year later, that company's stock price had dropped 
75% after controlling for market effects (Edgar 2002). Is this just good timing by the 
CEO, or evidence of insider trading and misalignment of shareholder and CEO interests? 
More research needs to be done, especially in the timing of specific events among firms 
and their CEO's within the scope of compensation. 
VII. Policy Implications 
It seems obvious that there is a need for strong executive compensation policies to 
restore the trust of potential shareholders. As tables 1 and 8 show, current executive 
compensation structures may entice CEOs and other executives to use inside information 
to determine if, and when, to sell their own stock and avoid heavy losses. Since my 
results suggest that shareholders suffer when CEOs sell off a high value of stock options, 
policies should be implemented that limit the dollar value of stock options CEOs can 
sell within a certain period of time. In addition, a recent article in BusinessWeek, 
written by Louis Lavelle (2002), offers some very interesting, and possibly effective, 
policy ideas. 
According to Lavelle (2002), one possibility would be for a company's board of 
directors-who usually determine executive compensation structure-to handout fewer 
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stock options. Also, the government could discourage large option grants by creating tax 
penalties for companies that use them. In addition, companies could replace traditional 
stock options with options that increase in value only with an increase in stock price with 
respect to a peer group (Lavelle 2002). This would encourage CEOs to take measures 
that will help the company outperform their competition rather simply increase their 
stock price. Finally, Lavelle (2002) suggests that executives be required to wait 6 months 
from the day they exercise their options before they can actually sell their shares. This 
would prevent CEOs from cashing in on insider information (as seen in Table 1). 
In a recent New York Times article, Gretchen Morgenson (2002) reports the 
findings of two professors of human resource management at Rutgers who examined 
stock option grants and shareholder returns at the 1,500 largest American companies 
from 1992-2001. According to the study, Morgenson (2002) explains that companies 
who give out "significantly larger-than-average" option grants to their top executives 
provided much lower shareholder returns than those that dispensed "far fewer options". 
Professor Joseph Blassi (2002) concluded that his study, "strongly suggests that executive 
excess in stock options did not help total shareholder return over the entire decade". 
In short, it seems that CEOs need less incentive to boost short-term stock prices 
and more incentive to produce strong long-term company and share price performance. 
In other words, America's executives need to be given less stock options and be required 
to take more direct ownership in the company for which they are held responsible. This 
would be the most effective way to align the interests of the CEO (agent) and the 
shareholders (principals). During Bill Gates tenure at the head of Microsoft, he owned 
20-25% of his company's stock-no other CEO in my study owned as much as .6% of 
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their company's stock (Edgar 2002). Bill Gates value of stock options--both exercisable 
and unexercisable: $0 (Edgar 2002). Microsoft's average annual shareholder return 
above the S&P 500 from '93-'01: 27.2% (Edgar 2002). Microsoft's average annual 
increase in net earnings: 32.5% (Edgar 2002). In my opinion, all U.S. executives should 
follow suit. 
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